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  2 1. Introduction 
  Successful prosecution in anti-dumping cases involves two separate steps: 
establishing injury to the domestic industry from increased imports and determining a 
positive dumping margin.  The latter is typically measured by the excess of the price charged 
by the defendant firm in its domestic market over what it charges in the market where 
dumping is said to have taken place.  In the United States, the United States International 
Trade Commission does the injury investigation while the Department of Commerce 
determines the dumping margin. 
  In this paper, we offer a theoretical explanation of a surprising empirical finding 
relating to injury investigations in anti-dumping cases.  In an important paper, Hansen and 
Prusa (1996) carry out a careful econometric investigation of the determinants of an 
affirmative finding in the injury investigations conducted by the United States International 
Trade Commission.  Among other things, they find that the probability of a positive finding 
is higher when defendants are many and small than when they are few and large.  Stated 
precisely, they find that, holding the market share of defendant firms constant, “cumulation,” 
defined as the practice of aggregating over the exports of several countries, has a positive 
effect on the probability of an affirmative injury determination.  A subsequent paper by   
Tharakan, Greenaway and Tharakan (1998) confirms this finding for the European 
Community injury decisions as well.
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  That cumulation should raise the probability of a positive injury determination is not 
surprising: adding one more country to the set of countries investigated raises the market 
share of the accused firms and, ceteris paribus, must make the case for a positive finding 
stronger.  The surprising aspect of the Hansen and Prusa (1996) and Tharakan, Greenaway 
and Tharakan (1998) studies is the presence of what the former call the “super-additivity” 
effect:  for the same market share, cumulation raises the probability of affirmative injury 
determination.
2  Interestingly, however, neither of these sets of authors provides any 
explanation—whether heuristic or formal—of this finding. 
In this paper, we suggest one possible formal explanation for why affirmative injury 
determination is more likely when defendants are many and small rather than a few and 
large.  We show that the presence of many small exporters exacerbates the free-rider problem 
that accompanies multiple defendants.  Unlike the dumping margin, which must be 
determined separately for each defendant firm, the injury determination is common to all 
                                                 
1 The literature on anti-dumping, though still in its infancy, is growing rapidly.  For example, 
see Anderson (1993), Blonigen and Haynes (1999), Ethier (1982), Panagariya and Gupta 
(1998), Rosendroff (1996) and Staiger and Wolak (1992, 1994). 
2 As Hansen and Prusa (1996) note, this outcome has encouraged domestic industries to file 
more cases against countries with smaller market shares. 
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defendant firms: either all defendants are found guilty of causing injury to the domestic firm 
or all are acquitted.
3  To the extent that defense may be costly, this fact inevitably gives rise 
to a free-rider problem.  At one extreme, if a single large firm is subject to investigation, it 
has every incentive to defend itself.  At the other extreme, if tens of small firms spread over 
as many countries are investigated, none may have an incentive to defend, giving the 
domestic, plaintiff firms a free hand in influencing the outcome. 
Our analysis is closely related to the vast body of the literature on the private 
provision of a public good.  Among the directly relevant contributions are the papers by 
Rodrik (1986) and Panagariya and Rodrik (1993).
4  Rodrik (1986) offers an argument for 
why welfare-maximizing governments may choose tariffs over production subsidies in the 
presence of lobbying.  When lobbying is at the level of the firm, since output subsidies can 
be firm specific, they do not pose a free-rider problem.  But tariffs are levied at the level of 
the industry so that there is a free-rider problem at the level of the firm.  Therefore, the 
equilibrium tariff turns out to be smaller than the equilibrium level of subsidies and may be 
                                                 
3 In informal correspondence, a United States International Trade Commission official puts 
the matter as follows: “It is not possible to reach different determinations on imports from 
countries that have been cumulated.  The only way to reach different determinations is not to 
cumulate.” 
 
4 Also see Hillman (1989, chapter 6) and Ursprung (1990). 
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superior even though it distorts consumption.  Similarly, Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) 
demonstrate why, under plausible conditions, the adoption of a uniform tariff rule may lead 
to a superior outcome.  When lobbying for tariffs is at the level of the industry, the uniform-
tariff rule creates a free-rider problem since the tariff granted to one industry is granted to all 
industries.  This lowers the incentive for everyone to lobby. 
In the present paper, the free-rider problem, leading to the super-additivity effect, 
arises in the provision of defense by the defendant firms against the injury charge.  The 
defense provided by one firm becomes automatically available to all firms subject to the 
investigation.  This leads every firm to invest less on defense than will be the case in a 
cooperative solution.  Ceteris paribus, the larger the number of firms charged, the more 
serious the free-rider problem.   
To our knowledge, this focus on the free-rider problem on the defendant side of the 
game for protection is new.  Traditionally, the literature has focused on the free-rider 
problem on the side of petitioners.  For instance, in Rodrik (1986) and Panagariya and Rodrik 
(1993) above, lobbies seeking tariffs or subsidies are effectively petitioners.  Likewise, in 
anti-dumping cases, we may encounter free riding among petitioners since the domestic 
producers benefit from anti-dumping actions regardless of whether or not they contribute to 
the petition. 
Though our objective is limited and specific, we also provide a simple but general 
framework for the analysis of the injury issue.  To-date, the theoretical literature on the injury 
issue is virtually non-existent.  Therefore, future empiricists as well as trade theorists 
interested in this issue will find our framework helpful.  We begin in Section 2 with some 
institutional details and evidence on the increased role of cumulation in injury cases in recent 
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years in the United States and European Union.  Our formal model is then outlined in Section 
3.  Our main result is derived in Section 4.  Our brief concluding remarks are provided in 
Section 5. 
2.  Cumulation in Practice 
  The cumulation amendment was enacted by the United States Congress in 1984, 
which requires the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) to cumulate 
imports when a trade dispute involves imports from multiple sources. The statute states, “The 
commission  shall  cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports of the subject 
merchandise from all countries with respect to which petitions were filed or investigations 
were self initiated on the same day, if such imports compete with each other and with 
domestic like products in the United States market.”  
Prior to 1984, the USITC had some discretion with respect to whether or not to 
cumulate the imports of different defendants in the determination of injury.  But the 1984 
amendment makes it mandatory to cumulate in cases involving multiple defendants.  As 
Prusa (1998) documents, since the 1984 amendment, cumulation has been applied with much 
greater frequency.  While only 13 percent of the anti-dumping cases were subject to 
cumulation between 1980-84, as many as 75 percent became subject to this practice between 
1985 and 1994.  According to Tharakan, Greenaway and Tharakan (1998), cumulation has 
also been practiced liberally in the European Communities (EC). During 1980-87, 91 percent 
of the multiple-country filings were determined on the basis of the cumulated market share of 
imports. 
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Hansen and Prusa (1996) and Tharakan, Greenaway and Tharakan (1998) study the 
experience of the United States and EC, respectively, and show that holding the share of 
defendant firms in total sales constant, cumulation increases the probability of an affirmative 
injury determination.  According to an example considered in Hansen and Prusa (1996), 
when 40 percent of imports are under investigation and a single country is involved, the 
probability of an affirmative injury finding is 0.60.  But when the petition is filed against two 
countries with a cumulated market share of 40 percent, divided equally between them, the 
probability rises to .72.  This change represents a 20 percent increase in the probability of 
affirmative action. Extending the example to five countries, holding constant the market 
share of imports, the probability rises to .78 or by 30 percent. Tharakan, Greenaway and 
Tharakan (1998) provide similar examples using the estimates for the EC.  The probability of 
an affirmative finding rises from .92 for two countries to .98 for 3 countries, holding constant 
the market share of imports under investigation. Thus, cumulation has played a significant 
role in yielding a positive injury determination.  Why has this been so?  This key question is 
the subject matter of the rest of this paper. 
 
3. The  Model 
  We work with a model in which there are three types of firms: firms from the country 
in which dumping takes place, exporting firms subject to the anti-dumping action and other 
exporting firms.  The product under consideration is homogeneous and the firms are assumed 
to engage in Cournot competition.  We do not model the decision of domestic firms to bring 
the anti-dumping petition.  Nor do we formalize the process by which the firms charged with 
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dumping are chosen.  Our focus is on the choices made by defendant firms in the injury 
investigation. 
Throughout, we denote the variables associated with the country in which dumping 
takes place by upper case letters, those associated with the firms subject to the anti-dumping 
action by lower-case letters and those relating to other exporting firms by lower-case letters 
with an asterisk.  To keep the analysis simple, we work with linear demand and linear 
production costs.  Our central result does not depend in any way on these linearities, 
however.  Thus, we write the inverse demand function facing the firms in the country where 
dumping takes place as 
 (1)  P = a – bX 
where P denotes the market price, X the total demand, and a and b are positive constants.  
The equality of demand and supply implies 
(2)   
*
ij ij r X Q     q     q =++ ∑∑∑ r
s
where Qi, qj and qr
* denote the outputs of ith, jth and rth firms from the three sources.  
Assuming Cournot behavior, the profit maximization problem of a firm from the country 
where sales take place, say firm s, may be written: 
(3)    {}
s
*
ij r s ij r Q Max  H   a  b   Q         q        q   C    Q  =− + + −
 ∑∑∑
where Cs is the constant average and marginal cost of production of firm s.  Assuming for 
simplicity that firms within each group are identical, we can drop subscript s and denote the 
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Analogously, the solution to the profit maximization problem of a representative firm from 








Note that this solution assumes that the group of exporting firms not subject to anti-dumping 
action is known before production decisions are made.  Within the model, this property can 
be rationalized by assuming that the profit-maximizing price of each of these firms in its 
home markets is lower than the price in the market where dumping takes place.  Under this 
assumption, the firm knows beforehand that it will not be subject to a dumping investigation. 
The firms charged with dumping also know beforehand that they will be charged.  
Again, this can be rationalized by assuming that the profit-maximizing price of each of these 
firms in its domestic market is higher than that in the market where dumping takes place.  In 
addition, we assume that the presence of the dumping margin necessarily leads to anti-
dumping and hence injury investigation.
5  While the injury investigation is, thus, necessarily 
undertaken, there is uncertainty with respect to the final outcome and hence eventual 
prosecution.  Under the current national laws, which must conform to the GATT Article VI 
and the WTO Agreement on Anti-dumping, no anti-dumping duties can be levied without a 
positive determination of injury to the domestic industry. 
                                                 
5 Implicitly, we model exporting firms as discriminating monopolists.  A more sophisticated 
formalization would follow Brander and Krugman (1983). 
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We assume that the probability of a positive injury determination varies directly with 
the combined market share of the firms charged with dumping.
6  As is generally true in 
practice, this means that either all firms are found guilty or all are acquitted.  We further 
assume that the firms can invest resources to defend themselves against the injury charge.  
By assumption, the probability of a positive finding varies inversely with the total amount of 











∑ ∑ , 
where er is the expenditure on defense incurred by firm r.  Based on the assumptions just 
outlined, ρ1(.) > 0 and ρ2(.) < 0, where ρ1(.) and ρ2(.) represent the partial derivatives of ρ (.) 
with respect to first and second arguments, respectively.  In addition, we impose the plausible 
restrictions ρ11 < 0 and ρ22 > 0.  The former restriction says that the increase in the import 
share increases the probability of affirmative action at a diminishing rate.  The latter 
                                                 
6 To determine injury in the United States, the law directs the USITC to consider the volume 
of imports of the subject merchandise, the effects of imports of that merchandise on prices in 
the United Sates for domestic like products, and the impact of imports of such merchandise 
on domestic producers of domestic like products in the context of production operations 
within the United States. 
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restriction says that the marginal reduction in the probability of affirmative action attributable 
to the expenditure on defense declines as we increase the expenditure. 
We assume that if the finding on injury is positive, each firm is subject to a fine that 
is equal to the difference between the price in the market under consideration and that in the 
firm’s home market.  Assuming the firms are risk neutral and therefore maximize expected 
profits, we can write the objective function of firm k as 




ij r k k k ij r q, e
*
ij r k k ij r
 Max h  ρ(.)   a-b   Q   +    q   +   q   -c - f  q - e









                                                
where fk is the anti-dumping duty on firm k, ck its average and marginal cost of production 
and ek the expenditure on defense.
7  After some simplifications and assuming symmetry, we 
can represent the first order conditions by 
 
7 In practice, fine fk equals the dumping margin, which is calculated as the difference 
between the firm’s price in its own domestic market and the market in which dumping takes 
place.  Incorporating this feature into the analysis requires the introduction of the firm’s 
domestic market explicitly, which introduces complications that are not central to our 
analysis.  Instead, assuming the firm’s price in its own domestic market (not modeled) to be 
constant at P**, we can replace fk by P**-P and still obtain our central result.  Alternatively, 
as Bruce Blonigen has suggested to us, we could assume that the "fair value" used in the 
dumping margin is a constructed cost measure which is fixed.  The Department of Commerce 
uses the constructed cost method in a significant number of cases. 
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(8)  q1
β (1 β)
h  ρ (β, ne) f     f ρ(.)   (P   b q)  c   0
n
−
=− − + − − =  
(9)    e2 h    ρ (β, ne) f q  1 0 =− −=
where we have set β ≡ nq/X, the market share of the firms charged with dumping.  Also, 
taking advantage of the symmetry, we have set ∑ei = ne. 
According to (8), the expected marginal revenue must be set equal to the marginal 
cost of production.  The first term on the left-hand side of this equation is the reduction in the 
revenue due to increased probability of a positive finding and hence increased expected fine 
on the existing quantity sold.  The second term in the same equation is the expected fine on 
the extra unit produced and the third term the extra revenue generated by the sales of another 
unit of the product.  According to (9), the marginal revenue from increased effort by the firm 
to counter the dumping charge is equated to the marginal cost.  The first term in this equation 
is the reduction in the fine attributable to a unit increase in the effort to combat dumping 
charge while the second term is the cost of a unit increase in this effort. 
Given our symmetry assumptions, we can rewrite equation (2) as 
(2’)  X = NQ + n*q* +nq 
Equations (1), (2’), (4)-(6), (8) and (9) give us seven equations in seven variables: P, X, Q, q, 
q
*, e and ρ.  Thus, the model is fully specified and can be used to study the effects of the 
changes in costs, the number of firms and other parameters on the endogenous variables. 
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4.  The Super-Additivity Effect 
  According to the super-additivity effect, the probability of a positive finding rises 
with just cumulation.  That is to say, for the same market share, the ex post probability of a 
positive finding is higher for many small sellers than a few large sellers. 
Because the share of the firms subject to the dumping charge, β, is endogenous in our 
model, we cannot address the question at hand by changing n alone.  In general, as n 
changes, β will also change.  Therefore, we must assume that in the background, there is at 
least one another parameter that changes by just the right amount to hold β fixed.  For 
instance, if the rise in n leads to a rise in β, we may raise c by just the right amount to restore 
β to its original value.  Under this scenario, we are comparing two industries that are ex post 
identical in all respects except the number of firms subject to anti-dumping investigation.   
  At first blush, the proposed comparative statics exercise may seem rather complex.  
Our task is greatly simplified by two features of the model, however.  First, as we 
demonstrate immediately below, the constancy of market share of one set of firms implies 
constancy of price and hence total demand.  This feature is independent of the linearity of 
demand and cost functions.  Second, the impact of a change in n on the total expenditure on 
defense at constant β can be derived directly from equation (9). 
To proceed with the first of these points, let us use a circumflex (^) over a variable to 
denote the proportionate change in that variable.  The constancy of market share implies 
(10)   
^^
n + q = X
^
Differentiating (2’) totally, we have 
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(11)  , 
^^^ ^
Qq * q X   Q +  q* +  (n + q)  αα α =
^
where α, with appropriate subscript, denotes the market share of the given type of firms.  
Differentiating equations (1), (4) and (5), respectively, we can obtain 
(12) 
^ dP


















(1 - α )X    + 
P - C P - c*
αα =    
From (12) and (15), it is immediate that dP = 0 and hence dX = 0.  A fixed market share of a 
set of firms requires a fixed price and demand as well.  Furthermore, given dX = 0, equation 
(10) leads to n = . 
^^
 -  q
The super-additivity effect can now be readily derived from equation (9).   
Differentiating it totally, we obtain 
(16)  . 
^^
21 22 2 ˆ βρ β + ρ  q E E + ρ qq = 0
Here E ≡ e.n denotes the total expenditure on defense by the firms subject to the injury 
investigation.  Setting β  and substituting  , we immediately obtain  ˆ = 0
^^






E =   n
ρ  E 
, 
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Remembering ρ2 < 0 and ρ22 > 0, we see that E and n are negatively related.  That is to say, 
an increase in the number of firms is associated with a decrease in the total effort on the part 
of the defending firms and, hence, an increase in the probability of affirmative finding, just as 
the empirical evidence shows. 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
  In this paper, we have provided a theoretical explanation of the interesting finding of 
Hansen and Prusa (1996) and Tharakan, Greenaway and Tharakan (1998) that cumulation 
across many small exporters by itself leads to increased probability of an affirmative 
determination in injury investigations.  For the same import-penetration ratio, the verdict 
against many small sellers is more likely to be positive than a few large sellers. 
In the process of establishing our result, we have also provided the first formal model 
of injury investigations in anti-dumping cases.  A key feature of this model, missing from the 
existing models of anti-dumping, is the presence of third countries.  In our future work, we 
plan to exploit this feature to study the effects of anti-dumping on “third-country” exporters 
who are not subject to anti-dumping. 
  We conclude by noting an alternative explanation of the super-additivity effects 
suggested to us by Robert Staiger.  According to him, this effect may also arise if the 
probability of a positive finding rises with the dumping margin.  Ceteris paribus, the larger 
the number of firms exporting to the country in which dumping takes place the more intense 
is competition and hence the lower the price there.  As long as this does not impact the price 
charged by the exporting firms in their domestic markets, we will observe a larger dumping 
margin and hence a larger probability of positive finding on injury. 
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